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ABSTRACT
Background: It is often claimed that a regulated kidney
market would significantly reduce the kidney shortage,
thus saving or improving many lives. Data are lacking,
however, on how many people would consider selling a
kidney in such a market.
Methods: A survey instrument, developed to assess
behavioural dispositions to and attitudes about a
hypothetical regulated kidney market, was given to Swiss
third-year medical students.
Results: Respondents’ (n = 178) median age was 23
years. Their socioeconomic status was high or middle
(94.6%). 48 (27%) considered selling a kidney in a
regulated kidney market, of whom 31 (66%) would sell
only to overcome a particularly difficult financial situation.
High social status and male gender was the strongest
predictor of a disposition to sell. 32 of all respondents
(18%) supported legalising a regulated kidney market.
This attitude was not associated with a disposition to sell
a kidney. 5 respondents (2.8%) endorsed a market and
considered providing a kidney to a stranger if and only if
paid. 4 of those 5 would sell only under financial duress.
Conclusions: Current understanding of a regulated
kidney market is insufficient. It is unclear whether a
regulated market would result in a net gain of kidneys.
Most possible kidney vendors would only sell in a
particularly difficult financial situation, raising concerns
about the validity of consent and inequities in the
provision of organs. Further empirical and normative
analysis of these issues is required. Any calls to
implement and evaluate a regulated kidney market in pilot
studies are therefore premature.
Organ scarcity has always defined transplantation
medicine. The kidney shortage, however, has now
grown painfully acute. Thousands of patients with
end-stage renal disease are on waiting lists for a
kidney transplant. This situation fuels interna-
tional transplant ‘‘tourism’’—patients with suffi-
cient resources travelling abroad to purchase a
kidney—which can involve harm, exploitation and
coercion. More than 76 000 patients are currently
registered kidney transplant candidates in the
USA.1 Numbers are comparable, with regard to
the resident population, in many other countries.
Five to 10 per cent of the 66 000 kidneys
transplanted worldwide in 2006 were estimated
to be related to international transplant tourism.2
This grim picture lends increasing support to an
intriguing idea: to increase the supply of kidneys
by adopting a kidney market that is ethically
constrained, or ‘‘regulated’’. Proponents argue that
a regulated kidney market would increase the
supply of kidneys because financial incentives
would encourage people to provide a kidney.
Because of the excellent outcomes of live-donor
kidney transplantation and the relatively low
physical risk of nephrectomy in healthy individuals
under conditions of state-of-the-art health care, the
result would be a net gain in alleviated suffering
and lives saved.
Furthermore, proponents contest that a regu-
lated kidney market would be ethical because it
places constraints on kidney transactions. Charles
Erin and John Harris have given the most detailed
proposal of a regulated kidney market.3–5 In
summary, they outline the following features for
such a market. A government agency responsible
for public health and healthcare (such as the
National Health Service in the UK) would act as
a single buyer, purchasing kidneys for a fixed price
and then distributing them equitably among those
in need of a transplant. This arrangement, along
with the market’s national or regional confine-
ment, would reduce wrongful exploitation of the
poor. The risk of coercion would be low because
the option of selling a kidney is an offer, not a
threat, and reasonable alternatives of sustenance
remain (eg, the willingness to sell a kidney would
not influence eligibility for welfare benefits).
Justice would be promoted because former vendors
would have priority access to a kidney should they
find themselves in need of a transplant. Finally, the
single buyer would maximise benefit and minimise
harm because it could optimise transplantation
and nephrectomy outcomes more effectively than
current arrangements.
A further, more recent justification for a
regulated kidney market is that it will prevent
transplant ‘‘tourism’’. Because a regulated market
would save or improve lives locally, the argument
goes, it will minimise the pressure on patients with
end-stage renal disease to engage in often unsafe
and exploitative transactions abroad.6 7
This paper focuses on the first, empirical claim
about a regulated kidney market—namely, that
such a market would increase the supply of
kidneys. Market proponents claim that ‘‘surveys
suggest that the public favours compensation and
that compensation would increase donation’’.6
However, the data they cite to support this claim
are insufficient. Studies investigating the impact of
financial incentives in the deceased donation
context have limited significance for the context
of live donation.8–11 Moreover, surveys that do not
detail the conditions of a regulated kidney mar-
ket10 12 13 are too vague to assess how the popula-
tion would respond to such a market, and the
distinction between removing financial disincen-
tives and providing financial incentives is often
unclear.12 Attitudes about legalising live kidney
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sales10 may not reflect one’s willingness to sell an organ. Finally,
data from Iran14—the only country that has implemented a
regulated kidney market today—are difficult to extrapolate,
because the Iranian market allows for co-payments among
transplant recipients and living conditions in Iran are strikingly
different from those in industrialised countries.
We conducted an exploratory survey that specifically studies
indicators for behavioural dispositions to and attitudes about a
hypothetical regulated kidney market. The first of its kind, the
study aimed to gather preliminary data on the following
questions:
1. How many people would consider selling a kidney in a
regulated kidney market? Who would consider selling, and
under what conditions?
2. Would people consider providing a kidney to a stranger if
and only if they were paid?
3. Is the view that a regulated kidney market should be
legalised associated with an individual disposition to sell a
kidney in such a market (and vice versa)?
PARTICIPANTS AND METHODS
Survey methods
All authors of this paper jointly developed a survey instrument
based on Erin and Harris’s model of a regulated kidney market.3–5
The instrument consisted of three parts, surveying personal
experiences with and knowledge about kidney transplantation,
dispositions to sell a kidney in a regulated kidney market,
attitudes about legalising such a market, and sociodemographic
information (29 questions). The instrument was designed to be
self-administered on paper.
The description of the regulated kidney market read as
follows (translated from German): ‘‘The number of persons
waiting for a kidney transplant exceeds the number of available
organs. Possible measures to address this situation are discussed
in the international literature, for example, to allow healthy
persons to sell a kidney in a regulated kidney market. The
following hypothetical assumptions could be made regarding a
regulated kidney market: (1) A single institution buys kidneys;
(2) This institution distributes kidneys transparently and
according to statutory criteria (including a medically optimal
distribution); (3) Kidney vendors are paid with public funds and
receive medical follow-up in the context of statutory health
insurance; (4) Kidney vendors have priority access to an organ if
they find themselves in need of a kidney transplant; (5)
Revenues from kidney sales are exempt from taxes and do not
influence welfare entitlements (in contrast to other assets), i.e.
no one can be coerced into selling a kidney; (6) The kidney
market is nationally or regionally confined; and (7) It is still
possible to donate a kidney.’’ In addition, the mortality and
morbidity risks of live kidney donation under conditions of
state-of-the-art medical care15 were given.
Following this information, respondents were asked the
following question: ‘‘Imagine you could sell a kidney in the
above described regulated kidney market. Would you in
principle consider doing so?’’ Respondents could answer ‘‘No,
under no circumstances’’ or ‘‘Possibly yes’’ and were then
directed to different tracks of the questionnaire. Questions
about sociodemographic factors were adapted from a national
survey of Swiss university students’ living conditions.16 The
survey instrument was pretested on a convenience sample of 10
medical students, and this led to minor changes in wording and
the choice of illustrative examples. The survey instrument (in
German) is available on request.
Data were collected in April 2007. Of the 212 distributed
survey questionnaires, 192 were returned (response rate of
90.6%). There was no incentive to complete the survey. Data
about non-respondents were not collected. Respondents’
personal disposition to sell a kidney in a regulated kidney
market was indicated in 178 questionnaires. These question-
naires were fed into data analysis even if otherwise incomplete.
Missing responses were judged as insignificant and/or irrelevant
for the study questions, and therefore not further explored.
They are noted in the tables or texts as appropriate.
Questionnaires that did not indicate the individual respondent’s
disposition to sell a kidney were discarded.
Participants
The survey was given to third-year medical students at the
University of Zurich before a class on ethical issues in
transplantation medicine. The students were targeted because
of their ideal kidney seller characteristics—that is, generally
being young and liberal, healthy, educated and familiar with
medical information, and presumably with little financial
pressure to sell.
General background
The political system in Switzerland, a small country with a
population of about 7.5 million and one of the highest gross
domestic products per capita in the world, is characterised by
both liberalism and federalism. This is also reflected in the way
the healthcare system is organised.17 Private health providers
play a large role in the provision of medical care. However, the
federal government has important public health responsibilities.
The state ensures universal health insurance, including coverage
for transplant services. Organs for transplant are allocated
nationally. In 2007, when this study was conducted, 588
patients were on the waiting list for a kidney and 19 deceased
persons were on the list. The median waiting time for a kidney
was 921 days.18 Organ selling is illegal in Switzerland.
Protection of human participants
Survey participation was voluntary and all responses were
anonymous. The study was examined and exempted from review
by the institutional review board of the Canton of Zurich.
Statistical analysis
Frequencies and corresponding percentages for dichotomous
variates or medians and interquartile ranges for continuous
variates were calculated. Comparisons of dichotomous variates
were performed using the x2 test, with a p value of ,0.05
considered to be statistically significant. In an exploratory analysis
we assessed the predictive capacity of all candidate predictors
shown in table 1 for selling a kidney. Variable selection was
performed using a stepwise procedure (using an entry criterion of
p,0.05), which was bootstrapped 100 times. Variables for the
final model were selected if they entered the model at least 30 out
of 100 times. Thus, variates could remain in the final model
despite a p value.0.05. Results are given as odds ratios (OR) with
95% confidence intervals (95% CI). A biostatistician (LMB)
performed statistical analyses with Stata 10.
RESULTS
Respondents
Survey respondents (n = 178) had a median age of 23 years; of
these, 111 (62.7%) were female, 140 (78.7%) were members of a
Christian church and 83 (46.9%) indicated they were in a
Ethics
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relationship. Only two respondents had a child. The socio-
economic status of the vast majority of respondents (94.6%)
was high or upper middle. The present median net income was
CHF 1000 (J 610/£410/US$820)1 per month. Respondents
expected to have a median net monthly income of CHF8000
(J4880/£3280/US$6560) in 10 years. With 51 respondents
(31.3%) voting center-left, 34 (20.8%) voting liberal and 27
(16.6%) voting green, the predominant political orientation was
left-leaning or liberal (table 1).
Respondents were relatively familiar with legal aspects of
kidney transplantation: 63.5% correctly identified current Swiss
regulations about organ donation (table 2). The majority of
respondents (90.5%) had heard about organ selling before.
Willingness to receive a kidney transplant and to donate a kidney
If suffering from end-stage renal disease, most respondents
would be willing to undergo kidney transplantation. The
majority of respondents were also willing to donate a kidney:
135 (75.8%) said they would donate only to a loved one (eg, a
family member or friend), while 25 (14%) indicated they would
donate to a loved one or a stranger (table 3). A higher proportion
of those who would consider selling a kidney were willing to
donate a kidney to a stranger when compared with those who
would not consider selling a kidney (p = 0.0001). Further
analysis showed that 12 of the 15 potential kidney vendors
who were willing to donate a kidney to a stranger (80%) said
the reason ‘‘I would not donate to a stranger unless paid’’ was
not important for them, suggesting that they might provide a
kidney to a stranger without payment.
Disposition to sell a kidney in a regulated kidney market
Forty-eight respondents (27%) stated they would in principle
consider selling a kidney in a regulated kidney market. By
contrast, 130 (73%) said they would not consider selling a
kidney under any circumstances (table 3). Thirty-three
potential kidney vendors were unwilling to donate a kidney
to a stranger without compensation, and 25 of them
confirmed they would only provide a kidney to a stranger if
paid. Therefore, the confirmed total number of potential
kidney vendors who would provide a kidney to a stranger if
and only if paid was 25 (14%).
‘‘Very important’’ or ‘‘important’’ reasons against selling
included the fear of health consequences, the unwillingness to
undergo a non-therapeutic intervention and a sense of feeling
degraded by the sale of a kidney. Fewer respondents cited
concerns that the body is unlike other property as a basis for
hesitating to sell. Only a minority were afraid of being
stigmatised as a kidney vendor.
‘‘Very important’’ or ‘‘important’’ reasons in favour of selling
a kidney included: a sense of being able to decide for oneself
whether to sell parts of one’s own body, a sense of fairness to
benefit from providing a kidney when everybody else involved
in the transplantation procedure benefits and unwillingness to
provide a kidney to a stranger without payment (table 3).
Conditions for considering the sale of a kidney
Thirty-one of those who would consider selling a kidney (66%)
would do so only to overcome a particularly difficult financial
situation, such as unemployment (table 3). Twelve (25.5%)
would consider selling to secure their future—for example, by
investing in their education, even if they were not in a
particularly difficult financial situation. Four (8.5%) would
consider selling to buy luxury goods—for example, a new car.
The median expected minimum compensation was CHF50 000
(J30 5000/£20 500/US$41 000), while the overall expected
compensation ranged from CHF5000–9 000 000 (J3050–
5 490 000/£2050–3 690 000/US$4100–7 380 000). Only a fifth
of the possible vendors wanted to receive a non-monetary
reward, such as life-long health insurance or a stipend for
attending university.
Male gender, OR 1.64 (95% CI 0.82–3.29; p = 0.16), and high
socioeconomic status, OR = 3.24 (95% CI 1.38–7.61; p = 0.007),
were the two strongest predictors for selling a kidney. The
likelihood of selling a kidney was 40% in male respondents of
high socioeconomic status, as compared with a likelihood of
10% in female respondents of low socioeconomic status.
Attitudes about a regulated kidney market
Seventy-six of all respondents (42.7%) thought that a regulated
kidney market should be prohibited, 70 (39.3%) were unsure
1All currency conversions are as of April 2007 when the study was conducted (1 CHF
was approximately J0.61/£0.41/$0.82 at the time).
Table 1 Respondent characteristics
Characteristic
Respondents
(n = 178) Missing n
Age in years, median (IQR) 23 (20–26) 1
Sex 1
Female 111 (62.7)
Male 66 (37.3)
Nationality 1
Swiss 164 (92.7)
Non-Swiss with Swiss high school diploma 12 (6.8)
Non-Swiss 1 (0.5)
Religion 1
Roman Catholic 60 (33.9)
Protestant 72 (40.6)
Other Christian 8 (4.5)
Jewish 3 (1.7)
Muslim 3 (1.7)
Other 4 (2.3)
None 27 (15.3)
Partnership status 1
Partnered 83 (46.9)
Single 94 (53.1)
Married 0
Divorced or widowed 0
One or more child 2 (1.1) 1
Socioeconomic status 10
High 68 (40.5)
Upper 51 (30.4)
Middle 40 (23.7)
Low 9 (5.4)
Present monthly income in CHF,* median
(IQR)
1000 (500–1500) 13
Expected monthly income in CHF in
10 years, median (IQR)
8000 (7000–10 000) 19
Political orientation 14
Right-wing 9 (5.5)
Center-right 13 (8.0)
Center-left 51 (31.3)
Liberal 34 (20.8)
Green 27 (16.6)
Other 29 (17.8)
Data are number (%) unless otherwise stated.
*1 CHF was approximately J0.61/£0.41/$0.82 at the time of the study.
IQR, interquartile range.
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and 32 (18%) thought a market should be legalised (table 2). Of
those who would consider selling a kidney, eight (16.7%)
thought a regulated kidney market should be legalised, 15
(31.3%) thought it should be prohibited and 25 (52.1%) were
unsure. This implies that only eight of the 32 respondents
endorsing a market (25%) would also consider selling a kidney.
Thus, a positive attitude towards a regulated kidney market
was not associated with a disposition to sell a kidney if such a
market was in place (p = 0.68).
In sum, then, eight of all 178 survey respondents (4.5%)
endorsed a regulated kidney market and would consider selling a
kidney if such a market were in place. Further analysis showed
that six of these respondents were unwilling to donate a kidney
to a stranger. Of the six, five respondents confirmed they would
provide an organ to a stranger only if paid. Therefore, in this
sample, the confirmed total number of potential kidney vendors
who would provide a kidney to a stranger if and only if paid and
who would also endorse a regulated kidney market was five
(2.8%). Four of these five respondents would only consider
selling a kidney to overcome a particularly difficult financial
situation. The one respondent who would consider selling a
kidney to buy non-necessities expected a compensation of
CHF50 000 (J30 5000/£20 500/US$41 000). Only one respon-
dent was a ‘‘free-rider’’, that is, endorsing a market and willing
to receive a live-donor kidney, but unwilling to either donate or
sell a kidney.
DISCUSSION
This is the first exploratory survey that specifically studies
indicators for dispositions to and attitudes about a hypothetical
regulated kidney market. A considerable minority of 48
respondents (27%) would consider selling a kidney in a
regulated kidney market. However, 12 of these possible vendors
(25%) would also donate a kidney to a stranger and insisted
they would not only do so if paid. Moreover, 40 of the possible
kidney vendors (83.3%) thought a regulated market should not
be legalised or were unsure about this. Only eight of those
endorsing a regulated market (25%) actually would consider
selling a kidney. Finally, 31 of those who considered selling a
kidney (66%) would only do so in a particularly difficult
situation.
Limitations of this study
The present study has obvious limitations. First and foremost,
the sample of medical students from one university is not
representative. The respondents of this survey were young.
Their socioeconomic status was above average, and the majority
of respondents held liberal or left-leaning political views. It is
therefore unlikely that the results of this survey reflect the
opinions of the general public. However, the goal of the present
study was not to reach definitive conclusions about the
feasibility of a regulated kidney market. The goal was to gather
preliminary data on how a potential target group of possible
kidney vendors would respond to a regulated kidney market. In
our view, the present data suffice to show that the dynamics on
the supply side of a regulated kidney market are insufficiently
understood (see discussion below). Further empirical research is
therefore needed to evaluate the practical and ethical implica-
tions of a regulated kidney market.
A second limitation is that behavioural dispositions do not
necessarily correlate with actual behaviour. Hypothetical
decisions capture those components of actual decisions that
are themselves based on projecting hypothetical situations.
However, hypothetical decisions fail to capture the emotional
components of actual decisions.19 Kidney vendors, just like
kidney donors, are likely to experience strong emotions about
undergoing nephrectomy. These emotions can influence actual
decisions to donate or sell. Therefore, respondents who said
they would consider selling a kidney in a regulated kidney
market might actually not sell one (and vice versa). Similar
dynamics are known from the research setting, where it has
been shown that fewer than 20% of those willing to enrol in
future trials actually participate.20 But although attitudes are
not the sole determinant of actual behaviour, they significantly
and substantially predict how people will act.21 This is also true
in the healthcare setting. For example, conjoint analysis—which
is commonly used in marketing research to elicit consumer
preferences—has been applied successfully in various areas of
health policy.22 Given the controversies about a regulated kidney
market, health policy makers will need some level of evidence
suggesting that it might actually work. To date, this evidence is
not available.
A third limitation is that dispositions to sell a kidney and
attitudes about a hypothetical regulated kidney market might
change as debates continue or as practices become more
acceptable. The data collected in this preliminary study reflect
spontaneous dispositions and attitudes that were formed in an
overall liberal society which, however, traditionally rejects
organ sales. Nonetheless, health policy makers need to assess
the real-time consequences of introducing a regulated kidney
Table 2 Attitudes about legalising a regulated kidney market and knowledge about the current legal situation
in Switzerland
Characteristic
All respondents
(n = 178)
Possible vendors
(n = 48)
Probable
non-vendors
(n = 130)
Regulated kidney market
Should be legalised 32 (18) 8 (16.7) 24 (18.5)
Should be prohibited 76 (42.7) 15 (31.3) 61 (46.9)
Unsure 70 (39.3) 25 (52.1) 45 (34.6)
Assumed legality of …
Donating a kidney to a loved one or a
stranger*
113 (63.5) 28 (58.2) 85 (65.4)
Donating a kidney to a loved one only 48 (27) 14 (29.2) 34 (26.1)
Donating a kidney to a stranger only 6 (3.4) 2 (4.2) 4 (3.1)
Selling a kidney 2 (1) 2 (4.2) 0
Unsure 9 (5.1) 2 (4.2) 7 (5.4)
Data are number (%) unless otherwise stated. There are no missing n.
*This statement reflects the current legal situation in Switzerland.
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market and compare the anticipated outcomes with the
consequences of available alternatives. One of the central issues
in this assessment is whether it is reasonable to expect that a
regulated kidney market will increase the supply of kidneys
today and, if so, how this supply will be generated.
Practical and ethical considerations for health policy makers
Despite the limitations discussed above, the present study raises
important practical and ethical considerations for health policy
makers. First, respondents distinguished between what they
would do at the individual level and what they think society
Table 3 Willingness to receive, donate or sell a kidney
Characteristic
All respondents
(n = 178)
Vendors
(n = 48)
Non-vendors
(n = 130) Missing n
Would undergo transplantation for
end-stage renal disease
1
Live-donor kidney 158 (89.3) 44 (91.7) 114 (88.3)
Cadaver-donor kidney only 13 (7.3) 3 (6.3) 10 (7.8)
No 6 (3.4) 1 (2) 5 (3.9)
Would donate kidney
Loved one only 135 (75.8) 29 (60.4) 106 (81.5)
Stranger only 1 (0.6) 0 1 (0.8)
Loved one and stranger 25 (14) 15 (31.3) 10 (7.7)
No 17 (9.6) 4 (8.3) 13 (10)
Would consider selling a kidney
Yes 48 (27)
No 130 (73)
Important reasons{ against selling
Degrading to sell parts of
the body
74 (56.9)
Cannot simply decide
about selling parts of the
body
44 (34.1) 1
Do not want to undergo a
non-therapeutic
intervention
86 (66.2)
Fear of health
consequences
97 (74.6)
Fear of being stigmatised
against
21 (16.2)
Important reasons{ in favour
of selling
1
Can decide myself about
selling parts of the body
45 (93.8)
Fair to benefit when
everybody else benefits
30 (62.5)
Would not donate to a
stranger unless paid
28 (59.6) 1
Conditions of sale
Only to overcome
particularly difficult
financial situation
31 (66)
To secure future 12 (25.5)
To buy non-necessities 4 (8.5)
Expected minimum
compensation (in CHF)*
5000 4 (8.3)
10 000 7 (14.6)
20 000 9 (18.8)
50 000 14 (29.2)
100 000 4 (8.3)
500 000 5 (10.4)
.500 000 5 (10.4)
Expected compensation,
median (IQR)
4 000 000 (3 000 000–
8 000 000)
Nature of compensation
Money 38 (79.2)
Non-monetary reward 10 (20.8)
Data are n (%) unless otherwise stated.
*1 CHF was approximately J0.61/£0.41/US$0.82 at the time of the study.
{Important reason: Reflects participants choosing ‘‘very important’’ and ‘‘important’’ from a 4-point Likert scale of importance (very
important—important—not so important—unimportant).
IQR, interquartile range.
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should do at the policy level. Those who endorsed a regulated
kidney market would not necessarily consider selling a kidney if
such a market existed. Conversely, those who would consider
selling a kidney in a regulated kidney market did not necessarily
think it should be legalised. This finding is important because it
shows that dispositions to sell a kidney in a regulated kidney
market are difficult to extrapolate from data on attitudes about
legalising kidney sales.
Second, respondents who said they would consider selling a
kidney in a regulated kidney market were also more likely to
donate a kidney either to a loved one or a stranger than
respondents who would not consider selling a kidney. Twelve of
the potential vendors (25%) indicated that payment was not a
necessary requirement for providing a kidney to a stranger.
These findings could simply indicate that potential kidney
vendors were less risk averse than probable non-vendors.
However, the data might also suggest that a substantial
minority of those who would consider selling a kidney were
at least partially motivated by altruistic considerations. If this is
true, payment might not be the only strategy for motivating
individuals to provide a kidney to a stranger.
Third, 130 of all respondents (73%) said they would not
consider selling a kidney, no matter the circumstance. Further,
31 of those who would consider selling a kidney (66%) would do
so only in a particularly difficult financial situation, a finding
that raises concerns about the validity of consent as well as
inequities in the provision of kidneys. Questions relating to
inequities have been of less salience in the literature (one
exception is a paper by Robert Veatch23). A regulated kidney
market aims for equitable access to kidneys. However,
inequities in the provision of kidneys are not addressed3–5 or
are dismissed with reference to other acceptable but inequitable
social practices, such as payment for high-risk work.24–26 Not
everyone will share this position, however. For many people,
who gives, not just how many give, is morally relevant.
Moreover, exploratory results indicate that the effects of
financial duress may not be obvious. High socioeconomic status
was identified as the strongest predictor of respondents’
willingness to sell a kidney. Although in line with results of
the only other study that investigates individuals’ disposition to
sell a kidney in a regulated kidney market,13 this finding may
seem counterintuitive. Low income or wealth and responsive-
ness to financial incentives are often correlated. For example,
financial incentives for participating in survey research elicit a
higher response in low-income populations,27 and financial
compensation for participating in phase I research is valued
most by healthy volunteers with low income and low
education.28
However, financial incentives for foregoing a body part might
operate differently from financial incentives in other domains of
life (maybe unless selling a kidney is the only way to alleviate
poverty,29–31 which is excluded by the regulated market3–5). This
matters in so far as the number of kidney vendors in a regulated
market will depend upon who gives, and under what condi-
tions. Present data suggest that individuals of high socio-
economic status are willing to sell a kidney if they were in a
particularly difficult financial situation. However, this scenario
is unlikely, in particular in the presence of a functioning welfare
system. Is it possible, then, that a regulated kidney market
might prove ineffective? While the present data cannot answer
this question, they suffice to demonstrate our poor under-
standing of how financial incentives would influence indivi-
duals’ willingness to provide a kidney to a stranger, and thus
how a regulated kidney market would actually play out on the
supply side.
Fourth, given the above discussion, it is unclear whether a
regulated market would result in a net gain of possible kidney
providers. The study found that 25 of all respondents (14%)
would possibly provide a kidney to a stranger if and only if paid;
a total of five respondents (2.8%) also endorsed a regulated
kidney market. This finding is in accord with the results of the
only other comparable study, which found that 18.1% of the
Dutch population (n = 550) thought the chance that they
would provide a kidney to a stranger would possibly or
definitely increase with an attractive financial compensation.13
However, these numbers lend no direct support for the
effectiveness of a regulated kidney market. Since it is unclear
who would sell a kidney, and under what conditions, the
expected number of kidney vendors is difficult to estimate.
Moreover, there are no data to estimate whether a regulated
market would influence either deceased or live kidney donation
rates.
CONCLUSIONS
This preliminary study provides the first data testing one of the
central assumptions of a regulated kidney market, namely that
paying people for providing a kidney will increase the supply of
available organs. Study results suggest intricate relations between
behavioural dispositions to sell a kidney in a regulated market and
attitudes about adopting a policy implementing a regulated
market. Data also reveal a lack of understanding about the
expected dynamics on the supply side of organs in a regulated
kidney market. Hence, it is unclear whether a regulated market
will result in a net gain of possible kidney providers. Further
empirical and normative analysis of these issues is required. Any
calls to implement and evaluate a regulated kidney market in pilot
studies6 7 25 32 are therefore premature.
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